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Abstract
We provide a direct, elementary proof for the existence of limλ→0 vλ, where vλ is
the value of λ-discounted finite two-person zero-sum stochastic game.
1 Introduction
Two-person zero-sum stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [4]. They are
described by a 5-tuple (Ω,I,J , q, g), where Ω is a finite set of states, I and J are
finite sets of actions, g : Ω×I ×J → [0, 1] is the payoff, q : Ω×I ×J → ∆(Ω) the
transition and, for any finite set X, ∆(X) denotes the set of probability distributions
over X. The functions g and q are bilinearly extended to Ω ×∆(I) ×∆(J ). The
stochastic game with initial state ω ∈ Ω and discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1] is denoted
by Γλ(ω) and is played as follows: at stage m ≥ 1, knowing the current state ωm,
the players choose actions (im, jm) ∈ I × J ; their choice produces a stage payoff
g(ωm, im, jm) and influences the transition: a new state ωm+1 is chosen according to
the probability distribution q(·|ωm, im, jm). At the end of the game, player 1 receives∑
m≥1 λ(1− λ)m−1g(ωm, im, jm) from player 2. The game Γλ(ω) has a value vλ(ω),
and vλ = (vλ(ω))ω∈Ω is the unique fixed point of the so-called Shapley operator [4],
i.e. vλ = Φ(λ, vλ), where for all f ∈ RΩ:
Φ(λ, f)(ω) = val(s,t)∈∆(I)×∆(J ){λg(ω, s, t) + (1− λ)Eq(·|ω,s,t)[f(ω˜)]}. (1.1)
The Shapley operator provides optimal stationary strategies for both players. In par-
ticular, the result holds for any signalling structure on past actions. The existence
of limλ→0 vλ was established by Bewley and Kohlberg [1], using Tarski-Seidenberg
elimination theorem.
The purpose of this note is to provide a direct, self-contained proof for the
existence of limλ→0 vλ. The key idea is to represent the asymptotic behaviour
of a sequence of strategies by a simpler object. Let (x, y) ∈ ∆(I)Ω × ∆(J )Ω
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be a pair of stationary strategies. Every time the state ω ∈ Ω is reached the
next state is distributed according to q(·|ω, x(ω), y(ω)) and the stage payoff is
g(ω, x(ω), y(ω)). Thus, the sequence of states (ωm)m is a Markov chain with tran-
sition Q = (q(ω′|ω, x(ω), y(ω))(ω,ω′)∈Ω2 and the stage payoffs can be described by a
vector g = (g(ω, x(ω), y(ω))ω∈Ω . For any initial state ω, the expected payoff induced
by (x, y) in Γλ(ω) is given by
γλ(ω, x, y) =
∑
ω′∈Ω
tλ(ω, ω
′)g(ω′),
where tλ(ω, ω
′) =
∑
m≥1 λ(1 − λ)m−1Qm−1(ω, ω′) is the mean λ-discounted time
spent in state ω′.
A key observation, due to Solan [5], is that tλ(ω, ω
′) can be written has
a hitting time of an auxiliary Markov chain whose transitions are in the set
{0, λ, ((1 − λ)Q(ω, ω′))(ω,ω′)∈Ω2}. Thus, using a classical result from Friedlin and
Wentzell for finite Markov chains, one deduces that tλ(ω, ω
′) is a rational fraction
in the variables λ and ((1 − λ)Q(ω, ω′))(ω,ω′)∈Ω2 , and that both polynomials in the
numerator and denominator have nonnegative coefficients and are of degree at most
|Ω|. For a fixed y, a similar assertion is obtained for γλ(ω, x, y) as a function of the
variables λ and ((1− λ)xi(ω))(ω,i)∈Ω×I . That is, γλ(ω, x, y) is a rational fraction in
these variables. One can easily check that the monomials both in the numerator and
denominator can then be written in the following form:
C(1− λ)bλa
∏
(ω,i)∈Ω×I
xi(ω)A(ω,i), (1.2)
where C > 0 depends on (y, ω) but not on (x, λ), a, b ∈ {0, . . . , |Ω|} and A ∈
{0, 1}Ω×I .
1.1 The asymptotic payoff
Consider now a sequence (λn, xn)n, where λn ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor and xn ∈
∆(I)Ω is a stationary strategy, for all n ∈ N. γλn(ω, xn, y), as n tends to infinity,
for a fixed stationary strategy y ∈ ∆(J )Ω.
Definition 1.1. A sequence (λn, xn)n in (0, 1]×∆(I)Ω is regular if limn→∞ λn = 0
and if for any two monomials of the form (1.2) their ratio converges in [0,+∞] as
n tends to infinity.1
Regular sequences can be characterized by a vector. Indeed, introduce a finite
set:
M := {(A, a) | A ∈ {−1, 0, 1}Ω×I , a ∈ {−|Ω|, . . . , 0, . . . , |Ω|}}.
The sequence (λn, xn)n is regular if for all (A, a) ∈ M the following limit
L[(λn, xn)n](A, a) := lim
n→∞
λan
∏
(ω,i)∈Ω×I
xin(ω)
A(ω,i) (1.3)
exists in [0,+∞]. The regularity of a sequence depends on the existence of finitely
many limits. Thus, for any family (xλ)λ∈(0,1] of stationary strategies there exists
(λn)n such that (λn, xλn)n is regular.
1We use here the natural convention that 0
0
= 00 = 1 and 0β = 0, 0−β = β
0
= +∞, for all β > 0.
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Proposition 1.1. Let y ∈ ∆(J )Ω and ω ∈ Ω be fixed. For any regular sequence
(λn, xn)n , limn→∞ γλn(ω, xn, y) exists and depends only on the vector L[(λn, xn)n].
Proof. Let (λn, xn)n be regular and let L = L[(λn, xn)n]. We have already seen
that the expected payoff induced by (xn, y) in Γλn(ω) can be written as a rational
fraction whose monomials are all of the form:
mn := C(1− λn)bλan
∏
(ω,i)∈Ω×I
xin(ω)
A(ω,i), (1.4)
that the ratio of any two monomials mn and m
′
n converges as n → ∞, and that
the limit is determined by L (and the constants C,C ′ > 0). Thus, one can use
the vector L to define an order relation in the set of the monomials in γλn(ω, xn, y)
as follows: mn  m′n if and only if limn→∞mn/m′n ∈ [0,+∞). The set is totally
ordered. Dividing numerator and denominator by some maximal element m∗n, and
taking n→∞ we obtain that:
lim
n→∞
γλn(ω, xn, y) =
∑
(A,a)∈M+ C(A, a)L(A−A∗, a− a∗)∑
(A,a)∈M+ C
′(A, a)L(A −A∗, a− a∗) , (1.5)
where M+ := {(A, a) | A ∈ {0, 1}Ω×I , a ∈ {0, . . . , |Ω|}}, and where the constants
C(A, a) and C ′(A, a) are nonnegative for all (A, a) ∈ M+. The maximality of m∗
ensures that L(A− A∗, a − a∗) ∈ [0,+∞), for all (A, a) ∈ M+ and that not all are
0. The result follows. 
1.2 Canonical strategies
For any c = (c(ω, i)) and e = (e(ω, i)) in RΩ×I+ , we define a family of stationary
strategies (xλ)λ as follows:
x
i
λ(ω) :=
c(ω, i)λe(ω,i)∑
i′∈I c(ω, i
′)λe(ω,i′)
, ∀(ω, i) ∈ Ω× I, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1]. (1.6)
Assume, in addition, that
∑
i∈I, e(ω,i)=0 c(ω, i) = 1 for all ω, so that
x
i
λ(ω) ∼λ→0 c(ω, i)λe(ω,i), ∀(ω, i) ∈ Ω× I. (1.7)
The exponent determines the order of magnitude of the probability of playing the
action i at state ω asymptotically; the coefficient c(ω, i) its intensity.
Definition 1.2. A family of strategies (xλ)λ∈(0,1] is canonical if it is induced by
some x = (c, e) in the following set:
X = {(c, e) ∈ (R∗+ × R+)Ω×I | ∀ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i∈I, e(ω,i)=0
c(ω, i) = 1}.
Note that the coefficients are taken strictly positive.
For all (A, a) ∈M and x = (c, e) ∈ X the following limit exists:
Lx(A, a) := lim
λ→0
λa
∏
(ω,i)
x
i
λ(ω)
A(ω,i). (1.8)
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Indeed, a direct consequence of (1.7) is that:
Lx(A, a) = lim
λ→0
λa+
∑
(ω,i) A(ω,i)e(ω,i)
∏
(ω,i)
c(ω, i)A(ω,i),
where
∏
(ω,i) c(ω, i)
A(ω,i) > 0. Thus:
Lx(A, a) ∈

{0}, iff a+∑(ω,i)A(ω, i)e(ω, i) > 0,
{+∞}, iff a+∑(ω,i)A(ω, i)e(ω, i) < 0,
(0,+∞), iff a+∑(ω,i)A(ω, i)e(ω, i) = 0.
(1.9)
Thus, for any x ∈ X and any vanishing sequence (λn)n of discount factors, the
sequence (λn,xλn)n is regular. Moreover, Lx = L[(λn,xλn)n] for any such sequence.
2 Main results
2.1 Representation of a regular sequence by a canonical
strategy
Fix some regular sequence (λn, xn)n throughout this section and let L = L[(λn, xn)n] ∈
[0,+∞]M the vector defined in (1.3). Notice that L has many elementary properties:
(P1) L(0, 0) = 1 and, for all (A, a) 6= 0, L(A, a) = +∞ if and only if L(−A,−a) = 0;
(P2) For all µ ∈ R, L(0, µ) := limn→∞ λµn = 0 ⇔ µ > 0 and L(0, µ) ∈ (0,+∞) ⇔
µ = 0. In particular, L(0, µ) ∈ {0, 1,+∞} for all µ ∈ R;
(P3) If L(A, a) < +∞, L(µA, µa) := limn→∞ λµan
∏
(ω,i) x
i
n(ω)
µA(ω,i) = L(A, a)µ;
(P4) If L(A, a) < +∞ and L(B, b) < +∞, then L(A+B, a+ b) = L(A, a)L(B, b).
Proposition 2.1. There exists x ∈ X such that Lx = L.
Proof. Note that
∏
(ω,i) c(ω, i)
A(ω,i) > 0 for any A ∈ {−1, 0, 1}Ω×I . Thus, from
(1.9) and (P1) one deduces the following necessary and sufficient conditions on the
coefficients and the exponents (c, e) of x for having Lx = L:∑
(ω,i)
A(ω, i)e(ω, i) + a > 0, ∀(A, a) ∈ M s.t. L(A, a) = 0, (2.1)∑
(ω,i)
A(ω, i)e(ω, i) + a = 0, ∀(A, a) ∈ M s.t. L(A, a) ∈ (0,+∞), (2.2)∏
(ω,i)
c(ω, i)A(ω,i) = L(A, a), ∀(A, a) ∈ M s.t. L(A, a) ∈ (0,+∞). (2.3)
Notation: Let L0 := {(A, a) ∈ M | L(A, a) = 0} and L+ := {(A, a) ∈
M | L(A, a) ∈ (0,+∞)}. Put L := L0 ∪ L+.
Solving for the exponents. Let us prove that the system (2.1)-(2.2) has a solu-
tion. One and only one of the systems (2.1)-(2.2) and (2.4)-(2.5)-(2.6) is consistent
(see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [3], part A, page 28):∑
(A,a)∈L
µ(A, a)A = 0, µ|L0 ≥ 0, (2.4)
−
∑
(A,a)∈L
µ(A, a)a ≥ 0, (2.5)
−
∑
(A,a)∈L
µ(A, a)a+
∑
(A,a)∈L0
µ(A, a) > 0, (2.6)
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Let us prove that the system (2.4)-(2.5)-(2.6), with unknowns µ = (µ(A, a))(A,a) ∈
R
L, is inconsistent. In (2.4), µ|L0 := (µ(A, a))(A,a)∈L0 denotes the restriction of µ to
L0. Assume (2.4). On the one hand, by (P3)-(P4), for all µ ∈ RL:∏
(A,a)∈L+
L(A, a)µ(A,a) = L
(∑
(A,a)∈L+
µ(A, a)A,
∑
(A,a)∈L+
µ(A, a)a
)
∈ (0,+∞).(2.7)
On the other hand, by (P3)-(P4), for all µ ∈ RL such that µ|L0 ≥ 0 one has:
∏
(A,a)∈L0
L(A, a)µ(A,a) = L
( ∑
(A,a)∈L0
µ(A, a)A,
∑
(A,a)∈L0
µ(A, a)a
)
=
{
1 if µ|L0 = 0,
0 otherwise.
(2.8)
Multiplying (2.7) and (2.8) yields, by assumption (2.4) :
L
(
0,
∑
(A,a)∈L
µ(A, a)a
)
∈
{
(0,+∞) if µ|L0 = 0,
{0} otherwise. (2.9)
By (P2), the first case implies
∑
(A,a)∈L µ(A, a)a = 0, which contradicts (2.6), and
the second case implies
∑
(A,a)∈L µ(A, a)a > 0, which contradicts (2.5). The system
(2.4)-(2.5)-(2.6) being inconsistent, the existence of a solution to (2.1)-(2.2) in RΩ×I
follows. The boundedness of xn(ω, i) implies that L((0, . . . , 1
(ω,i), . . . , 0), 0) < +∞,
so that e(ω, i) ≥ 0 by (2.1) and (2.2).
Solving for the coefficients. Taking the logarithm in (2.3) yields:∑
(ω,i)
A(ω, i) ln c(ω, i) = ln(L(A, a)), ∀(A, a) ∈ L+, (2.10)
which is a linear system in d = (ln c(ω, i))(ω,i) ∈ RΩ×I . As before, one and only one
of the systems (2.10) and (2.11) is consistent:∑
(A,a)∈L+
µ(A, a)A = 0,
∑
(A,a)∈L+
µ(A, a) ln(L(A, a)) > 0. (2.11)
Let us prove that the system (2.11), with unkowns µ = (µ(A, a))(A,a) ∈ RL+, is
inconsistent. Suppose that
∑
(A,a)∈L+
µ(A, a)A = 0. Then, by (P3)-(P4):
∏
(A,a)∈L+
L(A, a)µ(A,a) = L
(
0,
∑
(A,a)∈L+
µ(A, a)a
)
∈ (0,+∞).
By (P2), this implies
∑
(A,a)∈L+
µ(A, a)a = 0 and, a fortiori,
∏
(A,a)∈L+
L(A, a)µ(A,a) =
1, so that (2.11) fails. Consequently, there exists c = (exp(d(ω, i)) ∈ (R∗+)Ω×I sat-
isfying (2.3).
2.2 Convergence of the discounted values
Theorem 2.1. The limit of (vλ)λ, as λ tends to 0, exists. Moreover, there exists
x ∈ X such that (xλ)λ is asymptotically optimal, i.e. for all ε > 0, there exists
λ0 ∈ (0, 1] such that:
γλ(ω,xλ, y) ≥ limλ→0 vλ(ω)− ε, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀y ∈ ∆(J )Ω, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ0).
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Proof. Let ω ∈ Ω be fixed. Let (xλ)λ>0 be a family of optimal stationary
strategies in (Γλ(ω))λ>0 and let (λn)n be a sequence of discount factors such
that limn→∞ vλn(ω) = lim supλ→0 vλ(ω). The optimality of xλn implies that
γλn(ω, xλn , j) ≥ vλn(ω), for all j ∈ J Ω. Indeed, against a stationary strategy of
player 1, player 2 faces a Markov decision process. Thus, player 2 has a pure sta-
tionary best reply. Up to some subsequence, (λn, xλn)n is regular. By Proposition
2.1, there exists x ∈ X such that Lx = L[(λn, xλn)n]. Thus, by Proposition 1.1,
limn→∞ γλn(ω, xλn , j) = limn→∞ γλn(ω,xλn , j), ∀j ∈ J Ω.
On the other hand, the limit limλ→0 γλ(ω,xλ, j) exists. Consequently:
limλ→0 γλ(ω,xλ, j) = limn→∞ γλn(ω, xλn , j) ≥ lim supλ→0 vλ(ω), ∀j ∈ J Ω.
(2.12)
It follows that for all ε > 0 there exists λ0 ∈ (0, 1] such that:
min
j∈JΩ
γλ(ω,xλ, j) ≥ lim supλ→0 vλ(ω)− ε, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ0). (2.13)
The latter implies that vλ(ω) ≥ lim supλ→0 vλ(ω) − ε, for all λ ∈ (0, λ0), and the
existence of limλ→0 vλ follows by taking the lim inf. The canonical strategy x has
the desired property.
2.3 Concluding remarks
(1) Consider an infinitely repeated stochastic game where the past actions are
observed. The existence of the uniform value is due to Mertens and Neyman
[2] and relies on the following result:
Theorem 2.2. Let f : (0, 1)→ RΩ be a function such that:
(a) ‖fλ − fλ′‖ ≤
∫ λ′
λ
ϕ(x)dx, for all 0 < λ < λ′ < 1 and for some ϕ ∈
L1
(
(0, 1],R+
)
;
(b) There exists λ0 > 0 such that Φ(λ, fλ) ≥ fλ, for all λ ∈ (0, λ0).2
Then, player 1 can guarantee limλ→0 fλ in Γ∞.
One can use Theorem 2.1 to prove the existence of the uniform value. Indeed,
for any x ∈ ∆(I)Ω, ω ∈ Ω and λ ∈ (0, 1], let wxλ(ω) := minj∈JΩ γλ(ω, x, j) be
the payoff guaranteed by x in Γλ(ω). One can check that w
x
λ ≤ Φ(λ,wxλ), for
all λ ∈ (0, 1]. Besides, for any x ∈ X, the functions (λ 7→ wxλλ (ω))ω∈Ω are of
bounded variation, so that player 1 can guarantee limλ→0w
xλ
λ for any x ∈ X
by Theorem 2.2. In particular, if (xλ)λ is asymptotically optimal, player 1 can
guarantee limλ→0 vλ.
(2) The existence of an x ∈ X such that (xλ)λ is asymptotically optimal was
already noticed by Solan and Vieille [6]. The result was deduced from the
semi-algebraicity of λ 7→ vλ, obtained in [1] using Tarski-Seidenberg elimination
theorem.
2Φ is the Shapley operator, defined in (1.1).
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(3) In the system (2.1)-(2.2) for the exponents (first part of the proof of Proposition
2.1) note that all the entries of A are in {−1, 0, 1}. This implies the existence
of a solution having all its coordinates in {0, 1/N, 2/N, . . . }, for some N ≤
|Ω||I|
√
|Ω||I|.
(4) Our approach fails without the finiteness assumption on I , J and Ω. A recent
example where I and J are compact, q is continuous, g is independent of the
actions and the family (vλ)λ does not converge is due to Vigeral [7].
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